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I. INTRODUCTION
n Marine Bank v. Weaver,' the United States Supreme Court decided
that a certificate of deposit purchased from a federally-regulated bank
was not, under the circumstances of the case, a security under federal
laws. Several recent federal court cases have considered the question of
the status of certificates of deposit under factual circumstances somewhat
different from Weaver. Two of these cases provide an interesting study of
the uncertainty that continues to surround the definition of a security.'
* Associate Professor, The University of Tulsa College of Law; A.B., M.A., Ohio Univer-
sity; J.D., The University of Michigan Law School.
1 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
2 Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1982), appeal dis-
missed, 721 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, -
U.S. __, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985); Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983). Another recent lower federal court decision involving the
status of certificates of deposit is Gary Plastic Packaging v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In that
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The definitions of "security" found in the Securities Act of 19331 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 are very similar; therefore, any in-
terpretation of the term under one Act carries substantial weight in inter-
preting the term for the purposes of the other.5 In addition, the defini-
case the court, citing Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, held that the plaintiff's allegation of fraud was
unfounded in fact and that a certificate of deposit issued by an "American banking institu-
tion" such as those involved in the case was not a security. The court stated that the "inge-
nious argument that the 'CD Program' itself, as distinguished from the certificates of de-
posit themselves, is a 'security' will not withstand scrutiny .... A program to sell a
nonsecurity cannot become a security absent an appellate pronouncement to the contrary."
Id. at 98, 444. Rapp, The Role of Promotional Characteristics in Determining the Existence
of a Security, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 26 (1981)(arguing that the way in which an interest is pro-
moted may be a factor in the determination of whether a security exists).
' Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)(1982). The definition is:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitshar-
ing agreement, collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any inter-
est or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(2)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)(1982). The defini-
tion is:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral trust certificate, preorganiza-
tion certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,votingtrust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (in-
cluding any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, strad-
dle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security";
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the forego-
ing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
o Weaver, 455 U.S. at 555 n.3. ("We have consistently held that the definition of 'secur-
ity' in the 1934 Act is essentially the same as the definition of 'security' in . . . the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 .... "). Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967)("The Securities
Act of 1933 . . . contains a definition of security virtually identical to that contained in the
1934 Act. Consequently, we are aided in our task by our prior decisions which have consid-
ered the meaning of security under the 1933 Act.") For a table setting forth a side-by-side
[Vol. 33:449
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tions of "security" under these two federal schemes are similar to the
definition found in the Uniform Securities Act.' Thus, "[wihile there are
some differences, the basic definition of a security under the Securities
Act, the Exchange Act, and state blue sky laws is the same." 7
Despite the lengthy definitions of "security" found in federal securities
laws, much uncertainty remains as to exactly what is included within the
concept of a security.8 This state of affairs is unacceptable given the im-
portance of the issue to the business community and its legal counselors.9
This Article will discuss briefly the well-known Howey test and several
questions regarding its interpretation. This Article will then address the
three most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the definition of "se-
curity" under the federal securities laws and show that these cases either
have continued or compounded the confusion over the definition. The
two post-Weaver certificate-of-deposit cases will then be examined in an
effort to demonstrate the uncertainty which remains concerning the sta-
tus of certificates of deposit under the federal securities laws. This Article
will then conclude with a discussion of the confusion that has resulted
due to judicial disagreement as to overriding policy and will propose that
decisive action by the Supreme Court is necessary to bring some clarity
and certainty to this important area of the law.
I. THE Howey TEST: A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION
The term "security" has long been accorded a broad interpretation by
both federal and state courts.'0 In particular, the catch-all phrase "invest-
comparison of the 1933 and 1934 Act definitions prior to the 1982 amendment, see Hannan
& Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 221 n.13 (1974). The 1982 amendments to both of the Acts added the
following identical language to each: "any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein
or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign current." See Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97303, §§ 1, 2, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982)(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77(b) & 78(c) (West
Supp. 1983)).
6 Section 401(1) of the Uniform Securities Act. This similarity is not mere coincidence.
The Commissioners' Note to this section indicates that it is based on § 2(1) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 631 (1978).
7 BLOOMENTHAL, 1981 SEcuRITiEs LAW HANDBOOK 18.
See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 5, at 219 ("The definition of the term 'security,'
as used in the principal federal securities laws, is for the most part one of the best kept
secrets in recent legal history.").
° See infra note 197.
, One commentator has stated: "Indeed, perhaps the day is not far hence when it will
be said of the securities laws as it has been similarly said of heaven, the Internal Revenue
Code, and the antitrust statutes that 'not a sparrow falls without the securities laws nodding
their assent.'" Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaning-
ful Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 367, 368 n.9 (1967). Cf. Newton, What is a Security?: A
Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167, 199 (1977)("investments once thought to fall beyond the
1984-851
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ment contract," found in the definition of "security" under both federal
and state law, has been utilized to fulfill the remedial purposes of the
federal and state acts. The Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he reach of the [Securities] Act does not stop with the obvious
and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices,
whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as a
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character in
commerce as "investment contracts," or as "any interest or in-
strument commonly known as a 'security.' ""
In the landmark Supreme Court case S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.,"2 the
now-famous Howey test was born. State courts, as well as federal courts,
have looked to this test to determine whether a particular interest consti-
tutes a security:"3 "[The question is] whether the scheme involves an in-
vestment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others." 4
For courts employing the Howey test, a number of questions of inter-
pretation have arisen. For example, the test speaks of profits coming
solely from the efforts of others. Read literally, this element of the test
would exclude any interest in a venture in which the efforts of the inves-
tor contributed to the profit earned. Recognizing this, a number of deci-
sions have held that "solely" does not really mean "solely." The best
known decision in this area is S.E.C. v. Glenn Turner Enterprises,"
where the Ninth Circuit held that "the word 'solely' should not be read as
a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract."1'
The court realized that if the requirement were read in a mechanical
fashion, it "would be easy to evade by adding a requirement that the
securities provisions have been absorbed into the securities categorization, often to the
amazement of newcomers to the securities bar"). In the last ten years, however, the Su-
preme Court has decided three cases involving the question of whether a security existed. In
all three it found that the instrument in question was not a security. Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551 (1979); United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Cf. Dillport, Restoring
Balance to the Definition of a Security, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 99 (1982)("Commentators on the
scope of the definition of the term 'security' . . . once discussed its expanding concept. In
recent years, however, the lower federal courts have narrowed the scope of the definition.").
" S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
1 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11 See, e.g., Rose v. Dobras, 128 Ariz. 209, 624 P.2d 887 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). "Case
applications of the Howey definition at both the state and federal levels are legion." Rapp,
supra note 2, at 27. Cf. Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d 1490 (8th Cir.
1984)(no significant difference in definition of security under Missouri law and federal law;
Missouri courts would look to federal case law for guidance).
" 328 U.S. at 301.
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
474 F.2d at 482.
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buyer contribute a modicum of effort."" The court found that the reme-
dial aims of the securities laws could best be served by adopting a "more
realistic test, [one which examines] whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essen-
tial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."' 8 Under
this rationale, an investor may contribute his input, but it must be non-
investors who make crucial managerial decisions.
Another question of interpretation has involved the meaning of the
"common enterprise" requirement. Several courts have interpreted the
commonality element of the Howey test to require multiple investors and
a pro rata distribution of profits.'8 Other courts have rejected this hori-
zontal commonality;"0 rather, these courts have viewed the "common en-
terprise" element as requiring nothing more than the intertwining of the
fortunes of the investor with the efforts of either those seeking the invest-
ment or of other third parties.2 This more inclusive approach accepts as
7 Id.
1" Id. Did the Supreme Court, in United Housing Found., Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975), acquiesce to this interpretation of the Howey test? It has been noted that the Court
left the word "solely" out of its formulation of the definition of investment contract in that
case. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
The Turner decision has been analyzed by one author as a possible reaction by the Ninth
Circuit to the facts of the case before it:
Witness this sentence from the first paragraph of the court's opinion: "The trial
court's findings, which are fully supported by the record, demonstrate that defen-
dants' scheme is a gigantic and successful fraud." Unfortunately that case, and
others like it, may be demonstrating the truth of the old maxim that hard cases
make bad law.
Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Security," 27 U. MIAMi L. REV.
395, 405 (1973). See also infra note 65.
" See, e.g., Hirk v. AgriResearch Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99-102 (7th Cir. 1977).
" The requirement of multiple investors has been criticized on the grounds that "it
makes no sense to penalize the single investor simply because he happens to be alone in his
misfortune." Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Utah
1981). On the other hand, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court in Weaver rejected
by implication the position that commonality can exist in single investor situations. See
Note, Securities Regulation Incident to Certificates of Deposit and Privately Negotiated
Agreements: Departures From a Functionally Operative Definition, 62 NE. L. REv. 579,
598 (1983); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Thoele, 1982 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,854 (W.D. Okla. 1982)("this court must hold that vertical commonality between a single
investor and promoter does not satisfy the common enterprise element of an investment
contract." Id. at 94,408).
" See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521-22 (5th Cir.
1974). Some courts have held that it is not enough that the investor's fortune be dependent
upon the efforts of others. These courts, while not requiring multiple investors, have re-
quired a correlation between the success or failure of the promoter or third party and the
success or failure of the investor. Thus, if the promoter or third party can prosper while the
investor fails, there is no vertical commonality. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Brodt v. Bache & Co. 595 F.2d
459 (9th Cir. 1978).
1984-851
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sufficient either horizontal or vertical commonality.
A third unresolved question is whether the Howey test is to be applied
only to help courts identify "the somewhat elusive investment con-
tract,"22 or whether it is an all-inclusive test to be applied even to less
elusive types of securities, such as corporate stock; on this point there is
vigorous debate. The resolution of this issue will affect the validity of the
sale-of-business doctrine, discussed below2" in connection with United
Housing Foundation v. Forman.24
The Howey test has provided a basic framework for the determination
of whether many different instruments or transactions invoke the securi-
ties laws. Questions of interpretation that have arisen in the lower courts
generally have been resolved through an analysis of the perceived pur-
poses of the securities laws.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES: THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION OF
"SECURITY" CONTINUES
A. The Forman and Daniel Decisions
In recent years, the Supreme Court has considered several cases involv-
ing the issue of what constitutes a security.25 In United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman,26 the Court found that shares of stock in a non-
profit housing cooperative were not securities. The shares had entitled
the shareholder to lease an apartment in the cooperative and were non-
transferable, descending only to a surviving spouse. In part I of its deci-
sion, the Court rejected the notion that the purchased interest must be
considered a "security" simply because it was labeled "stock," and the
statutory definition of "security" includes the word "stock."27 The Court
stated that "[b]ecause securities transactions are economic in character
Congress intended the application of the statutes to turn on the economic
realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto." ' The Court pointed out that the shares involved had none of
the characteristics commonly associated with a security.2 9
In part II of its decision, the Court rejected the contention that a share
of stock in the cooperative constituted an "investment contract." Apply-
ing the Howey test, the Court stated that "there can be no doubt that
22 Brorrstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925, 929 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
23 See infra text accompanying notes 31-35.
24 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
'5 See supra note 10.
26 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
17 Id. at 848.
Id. at 849. Still, "[a] share of stock will almost always be deemed to be a 'security.'"
D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 23 (2d ed. 1982).
" 421 U.S. at 851.
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investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live,
and not by financial returns on their investments.
30
The Forman decision, like that in Howey, has generated conflicting in-
terpretations. Perhaps most significantly, courts and commentators have
been unable to agree on whether Forman authorizes application of the
Howey test to corporate stock. Those that believe that it does"' focus in
part on the following statement made by the Court: "We reject at the
outset any suggestion that the present transaction, evidenced by the sale
of shares called 'stock,' must be considered a security transaction simply
because the statutory definition of a security includes the word 'any...
stock.' "32 Others reject this interpretation, alleging instead that the For-
man Court applied the Howey test only after deciding, in effect, that the
shares involved in the case were not really stock.33 Such a theory was
adopted by the Second Circuit: "Having first determined that the . . .
shares were not stock, the Court went on to determine whether they were
an 'investment contract.'-"4
This argument is, in reality, part of a larger conflict, to wit, whether the
Howey test is a general test which all securities must meet, or whether it
merely defines the catch-all term "investment contract," so that there are
"securities" that do not meet the requirements set out in the test. Com-
mentators remain hopelessly divided on the issue.35
In a second recent decision, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel,"6 the Supreme Court held that a compulsory, noncontributory
pension plan did not constitute a "security" under federal security laws.
The Court stated that the test of whether a financial relationship consti-
tutes an "investment contract" is the Howey test;3 7 however, "[tihis test
is to be applied in light of the 'substance-the economic realities of the
transaction-rather than the names that may have been employed by the
parties.' "38
" Id. at 853.
31 See, e.g., Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Somogyi v. But-
ler, 518 F. Supp. 971 (D.N.J. 1981)(alternate ground for decision). See also Thompson, The
Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a
Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225, 24452 (1982).
a' 421 U.S. at 848.
See, e.g., Coffin v. Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979); Wilsman v. Upjohn Co., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED_ SEC. L_ REP. (CCH) T
91,517 (W.D. Mich. 1984); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
3" Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982).
"' Compare Deacon & Prendergast, Defining a "Security" After the Forman Decision,
11 PAc. L.J. 213, 21718 (1980)(Howey test is a universal test), with Karajala, Realigning
Federal and State Roles in Securities Regulation Through the Definition of a Security,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 419-20 (court in Forman did not use Howey test to decide if inter-
ests were stock).
439 U.S. 551 (1979).
', Id. at 558.
3 Id. (quoting United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 85-152 (1975)).
t984-851
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Applying the Howey test to the facts of this case, the Court found first
that there was no investment of money"9 and, second, that there was no
expectation of profit from a common enterprise.4 The Court rejected the
plaintiff-employee's argument that by allowing part of his compensation
to be paid into it, he had invested in the compulsory pension fund.
"[Tihe purported investment [was] a relatively insignificant part of [the]
employee's total and indivisible compensation package;"4 the "decision
to accept and retain covered employment must have only an attenuated
relationship, if any, to perceived investment possibilities of a future pen-
sion."4 ' In addition, under this pension plan, the eligibility of an em-
ployee depended primarily on whether the employee met the vesting re-
quirements.43 Thus, any "profit" expected by an employee would be a
result of his or her own efforts rather than on the managerial efforts of
the trustee.4
After applying a Howey analysis and noting the passage of the Em-
ployee Retirement Security Act of 1974' in part IV of its opinion,4 the
Court addressed the effect of this legislation on the characterization of
the Daniel pension plan:
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the
use and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all
arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory,
compulsory pension plans. Congress believed that it was filling a
regulatory void when it enacted ERISA . . . . Not only is the ex-
tention of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported by
the language and history of those Acts, but in light of ERISA it
serves no general purpose.47
'9 439 U.S. at 559-61.
40 439 U.S. at 561-62.
Id. at 560. The Court noted, however, that it was not deciding that a person must
invest money, rather than property or services. Id. at n.12. The Court was simply unwilling
to allocate part of the labor, on the facts of the case, as consideration for the pension. Id. at
560.
"8 Id. at 560. Was the Court's conclusion factually correct? Cf. Carney & Fraser, Defin-
ing a "Security": Georgia's Struggle With the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73, 98
(1981), wherein the authors state: "The opinion [in Daniell ignores the 'economic reality'
that pension plans have become the dominant mode of savings for many Americans, and
funneling investments through such institutions has grown tremendously in popularity over
the years."
" 439 U.S. at 562.
44 Id.
46 29 U.S.C. § 1001-03 (1982).
46 439 U.S. at 569-70.
Id. Cf. Carney & Fraser, supra note 42, at 75-76, where the authors note:
The ultimate difficulty in defining a security is, of course, that promoters offer a
continuum of opportunities to the public ... and there is no bright and clear line
to be drawn. In order to draw any line one must examine the justifying aim of
securities regulation, both in terms of the evil to be prevented and the skills of the
[Vol. 33:449
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This theme, introduced in Daniel as an afterthought, was to reappear in
the Weaver opinion.
After Forman and Daniel, the definition of "security" remained un-
resolved. One author stated that "the door [was] still open to the devel-
opment of basic principles in [the] area ... "48
B. Marine Bank v. Weaver
1. A Brief Summary of the Case
The most recent Supreme Court decision on the definition of the term
"security" did little, if anything, to resolve the open questions. In fact,
more questions may have been raised than answered.
Marine Bank v. Weaver49 involved a couple who purchased a $50,000
certificate of deposit from a bank. They then- pledged the certificate,
which was partially insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC), to the same bank to guarantee a $65,000 loan by the bank to
third parties. The quid pro quo for the loan guarantee was an agreement
between the owners of the certificate and the third parties whereby the
certificate owners were to receive fifty percent of the net profits of the
third parties' business and one hundred dollars per month for the dura-
tion of the guarantee. In addition, the certificate owners were given the
right to veto future borrowing by the business and were given the use of a
barn and pasture owned by the business.5 °
When the business subsequently filed for bankruptcy, the bank indi-
cated its intention of claiming the pledged certificate of deposit. The cer-
tificate owners then filed suit against the bank alleging, among other
things, a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. They
claimed that the bank officers had represented that the proceeds of the
loan that they were guaranteeing would be used by the business as work-
ing capital; instead, the money was used in large part to repay prior bank
regulator. One might, for example, determine that life insurance policies embody
all of the central elements of a security, and still decide that treatment as a secur-
ity was not appropriate, because specialized knowledge beyond that of most inves-
tors is required to evaluate the risks and merits of the offering. Indeed, one might
conclude that the legislature adopted a comprehensive regulatory scheme in recog-
nition of that fact. Bank certificates of deposit, pension plans, and other offerings
could arguably be excluded from the coverage of the securities laws for similar
reasons.
The authors argue, however, that by simply excluding items from the definition of "secur-
ity," courts have failed to provide a meaningful formula of the essential elements of a secur-
ity. Id. at 74.
"8 FitzGibbon, What is a Security?A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in
the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893, 907 (1980).
41 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
" Id. at 553.
1984-85]
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loans and cover an overdrawn checking account. Additionally, it was al-
leged that the bank officers were aware of, but did not disclose, the poor
financial condition of the business.'
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the
bank on the section 10(b) claim on the basis that "if a wrong occurred it
did not take place 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity,' as required for liability . . . . 5" The court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing that either the certificate of deposit or the contract between the cer-
tificate owners and third parties reasonably could be found to be a
security. 3
The decision of the court of appeals was reversed by the Supreme
Court. While recognizing that the definition of "security" under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 is broad and that the term has been inter-
preted in an expansive manner, the Court stated: The broad statutory
definition is preceded, however, by the statement that the terms men-
tioned are not to be considered securities if 'the context otherwise re-
quires . . . .' Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in enacting securi-
ties laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all
fraud." '4
The Court held, first, that the certificate of deposit was not a security;
bank certificates of deposit are significantly different from other long-
term obligations. The certificate of deposit in question "was issued by a
federally regulated bank which is subject to the comprehensive set of reg-
ulations governing the bank industry." 55 The Court then noted that "de-
posits [in federally-regulated banks] are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. Since its formation in 1933, nearly all depositors
in failing banks insured by FDIC have received payment in full, even pay-
ment for the portions of their deposits above the amount insured." 6
These considerations led the Court to conclude:
The definition of "security" in the 1934 Act provides that an in-
strument which seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is
not to be considered a security if the context otherwise requires.
It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit
to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abun-
dantly protected under the federal banking laws. We therefore
hold that the certificate of deposit [involved] is not a security.17
Id. at 553-54.
' Id. at 554.
53 Id.
" Id. at 555-56.
" Id. at 557-58.
" Id. at 558.
11 Id. at 558-59. The Court's comments were made prior to the collapse of the Penn
Square Bank. The amount of uninsured deposits at Penn Square has been estimated to be
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The Court also held that the agreement between the certificate owners
and the third parties was not a security. The agreement was "not the type
of instrument that comes to mind when the term security is used . . . ...
According to the Court:
The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior
cases involved offers to a number of potential investors, not a pri-
vate transaction as in this case. In Howey, for example, 42 per-
sons purchased interests in a citrus grove during a four-month
period. In C.M. Joiner Leasing, offers to sell oil leases were sent
to over 1,000 prospects. In C.M. Joiner Leasing, we noted that a
security is an instrument in which there is "common trading."
The instruments involved in C.M. Joiner Leasing and Howey had
equivalent values to most persons and could have been traded
publically.59
By comparison, the certificate of deposit owners and the third parties in
Weaver had negotiated a "one-on-one" unique agreement "not designed
to be traded publically."
Finally, the Court noted in passing that "the provision that the Weav-
ers could veto future loans gave them a measure of control over the oper-
ation of the slaughterhouse not characteristic of a security.""1 The Court's
holding in Weaver was, however, expressly limited to the facts of the
case. The final footnote to the opinion stated:
It does not follow a certificate of deposit or business agreement
between transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition
of a security as defined by the federal statutes. Each transaction
must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of the
instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and
the factual setting as a whole.2
2. Discussion of the Case
The decision in Weaver is interesting in several respects. First, the
Court based its decision on the "context otherwise requires" language
preceding the statutory definitional section. The Court delineated in gen-
$250 million. Wall St. J., July 16, 1982, at 17, col. 3 (S.W. ed.). The holders of these deposits
may lose over 20% of their principal. Wall St. J., July 9, 1982, at 18, col. 5, (S.W. ed.). The
adequacy of federal oversight and regulation under federal banking laws has been ques-
tioned as a result of the Penn Square failure, and the subsequent and related problems of
Continental Illinois Bank. See infra note 140.
1 455 U.S. at 559.
5 Id. at 559-60 [citation omitted].
60 Id. at 560.
6' Id.
Id. at n.ll.
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eral terms two factual situations in which the context did not require a
finding of a security and application of federal security laws. Before the
Weaver decision there had been significant discussion as to whether the
"context otherwise requires" language referred to statutory context or
factual context.6 3 The Weaver decision seems to support the position that
the prefatory "context otherwise requires" language permits inquiry into
the factual context in which the subject transaction arises.6 4
Second, while the Court mentioned the Howey case, it did not engage
in a Howey-type analysis of the status of the certificate of deposit.
Rather, it focused primarily on a perceived lack of need for application of
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. What makes this
approach intriguing is that a number of previous lower federal and state
court decisions perhaps can be best explained as attempts to use the se-
curities laws to fashion remedies where other remedies may have been
inadequate or nonexistent.E Weaver can be viewed as the negative image
13 See Thompson, supra note 31, at 250-51:
Some courts have viewed this phrase as express statutory authority to reject a
literal interpretation of the coverage of the federal securities laws. They have in
terpreted the term "context" as referring to the "surrounding factual circum-
stances: and have analyzed the particular transaction to determine whether it
evinces characteristics common to security transactions. Other courts have taken a
more limited view of the prefatory language, construing the term "context" as
referring to the "statutory context" that is, the definition of a term within the Act
may vary from one section to another.
64 Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982)("The Court [in Weaver] got around
seemingly uncompromising statutory language by treating the word 'context' . . . as having
reference to economic as well as linguistic context."); Thompson, supra note 31, at 251 ("the
Supreme Court [in Weaver] appears to have resolved this dispute in favor of the broader
approach to 'context' and against the literal approach."). But cf. Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran,
737 F.2d 320, 332 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, - U.S. -, 105 S.
Ct. 428 (1984)(post Weaver decision that appears to cling to statutory context interpreta-
tion). The author of one recent article presents a persuasive case that the Weaver Court's
conclusion is incorrect. See Bunch, Marine Bank v. Weaver: What is a Security?, 34 MER-
CER L. REV. 1017, 1036-37 (1983).
Cf. D. RATNER, SECURITiES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 26 (2d ed. 1982):
These terms ["investment contract" and "certificate of interest or participation in
any profitsharing agreement"] have been liberally interpreted by the courts to ap-
ply to a wide range of schemes, particularly where the SEC or state regulators
have sought injunctions against activities for which there was no prompt effective
relief available under other laws designed to protect the public.
See also Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Security," 14 REv. SEc. REG. 981, 982-83
(1981). Schneider states:
As a practical matter, it is likely that the inadequacy of disclosures or the exis-
tence of fraud affecting the transaction will militate towards the finding of a "se-
curity." For example, fraud tainting the offering seems to have influenced courts
in the context of pyramid sales and multilevel distributorship programs . .. .In-
evitably, courts seem to be result-oriented and are influenced by whom is suing
whom for what. For example, if a sophisticated party is trying to disaffirm his or
its own commitment by invoking the securities laws, such party is less likely to
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of these cases; it denied application of the securities laws because other
federal remedies and safeguards were deemed adequate. The Court's ap-
proach is reminiscent of part IV of the Daniel opinion." In Daniel, how-
ever, the Court spoke of the lack of need for application of the federal
securities laws only after applying the Howey test to the facts of the case.
The Weaver Court fails to explain why it eschewed a Howey analysis.
Two possible explanations come to mind. The Justices may have believed
that such an endeavor was unnecessary because the lack of need for ap-
plication of the federal securities laws was determinative. If this is true,
then an instrument that satisfies the elements of the Howey test could
still fail to be a security if there were no perceived need for application of
federal securities laws.6 7 On the other hand, the Court may have enter-
tained an unarticulated belief the the Howey test is not applicable to
debt (as opposed to equity) instruments."
Third, while the Court emphasized the protections afforded by federal
banking regulations in determining that the certificate of deposit was not
a security, several commentators have pointed out that those regulations
afforded no protection against the wrong alleged by the Weavers, i.e.,
having the certificate of deposit wrongfully taken from them. In addi-
tion, the Court failed to consider whether federal banking regulations and
federal securities laws address the same evils or pursue different goals."0
A final interesting aspect of the Weaver case is the Court's indication
that the scope of the federal securities laws is limited to those frauds
involving instruments having "equivalent values to most persons"'7 and
the ability to be "traded publically. ' ' 72 The phraseology "equivalent val-
ues" seems to connote some readily ascertainable value that would facili-
tate trading in the interest. Accordingly, the Court refused to apply the
federal securities laws to this "unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one
prevail than where the court believes the result would favor an unsophisticated
party or "victim" of an improper scheme.
" 455 U.S. at 558 n.7.
07 See Note, supra note 20, at 600 ("One important departure [in Weaver] seems to be
the Court's relegation of the Howey test to a secondary position when other federal reme-
dies are available.").
" There is a difference of opinion among lower federal courts on the question of whether
the Howey test applies to debt instruments. See, e.g., infra note 84 and infra text accompa-
nying notes 84 and 134.
" One author states that "the Court's analysis of whether the holders of certificates of
deposit are adequately protected by the federal banking laws is incomplete. Those laws do
not protect holders from being defrauded out of a valuable investment." Dillport, supra
note 10, at 139. See also Bunch, supra note 64, at 1034-35 ("[t]he federal banking laws do
not provide a private right of action for persons fraudulently induced to pledge a certificate
of deposit.").
"0 See Bunch, supra note 64, at 1030-31, suggesting that federal banking regulations and
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws serve different purposes.
" 455 U.S. at 560.
72 Id.
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by the parties." 3 Thus, while the Court purported to reaffirm the appli-
cability of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to "un-
common and irregular instruments,' 74 it was willing to leave parties to
unusual, negotiated transactions to their remedies, if any, under other
laws. This is perhaps the most controversial portion of the Court's opin-
ion. One criticism of this position is that "[tihe Court confused the issue
of what constitutes a security and those securities which are exempt from
registration. "
While it is true that a number of the considerations mentioned by the
Court do seem more pertinent to the question of whether an exemption is
available than whether a security exists, an argument can be made in
favor of the Court's decision:
[I]f it can be recognized that the danger of fraud is quantitatively
and qualitatively reduced where a transaction is both isolated and
private, there is persuasive force in the argument that the appli-
cation of the special fraud procedures, protections and remedies
of the securities laws should be cut off short of the thousands of
transactions which involve only a handful of knowledgeable or so-
phisticated buyers .
7
A stumbling block to a full understanding and evaluation of Weaver is
the fact that the Court did not adequately address the "why" question.
Thus, it is not possible to reach a conclusion as to whether the Court's
thinking on the issues involved in the case was simply muddled, or
whether the Court was making a conscious policy decision to remove a
large number of transactions from coverage by the federal laws on securi-
ties fraud.
73 Id.
7' 455 U.S. at 556.
71 BLOOMENTHAL, 1982 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK xlix. The author opines that "[t]he
Court's rationale for its holding, if an answer to a law examination including the identical
question, would probably have been graded F by 97% of the securities regulation professors
in the United States." Id. at xlviii. See also Bunch, supra note 64, at 1036 ("the court
erroneously equated the registration provisions of the federal securities laws with the anti-
fraud provisions of those laws.").
11 Coffey, supra note 10, at 411. Coffey agrees, however, with Bloomenthal that "as the
statutes are presently written, the isolated nature of a transaction and the element of pri-
vateness are generally relevant only to the issue of whether a transaction should be exempt
from registration ...." Id at 408. He states that "if it were decided that transactions which
are both isolated and private should be excluded from the definition of 'security,' such a
result could be assured only be an amendment of the definition provision." Id. at 411.
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IV. POST Weaver CERTIFICATE-OF-DEPOSIT CASES
A. Wolf
1. The District Court Decision
In Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico,7 7 the issue was whether time
deposits in a Mexican bank were securities within the meaning of the fed-
eral security laws. The plaintiff, Wolf, deposited $20,000 in each of three
different accounts with the defendant, Banco Nacional de Mexico. These
three accounts paid interest at net annual rates in excess of thirty per-
cent. Plaintiff's dollars, however, were converted into pesos at the time of
the deposit. As a result of devaluations when the plaintiff's pesos were
reconverted into dollars, the $60,000 principal had been reduced to ap-
proximately $35,000.78
Wolf brought suit against the bank alleging violations of the federal
securities laws including the sale of unregistered securities and the omis-
sion of material information in the sale of securities.7 9 The district court
held that the Mexican certificates of deposit were securities,80 however,
this decision was reversed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.8' Both opinions merit detailed consideration.
The decision of the district court that the deposits were securities was
based on considerations of: 1) the definitional sections of the federal se-
curities laws; 2) Weaver; 3) the Howey test; 4) alternate tests; and 5) a
synthesis of the case law. The court rejected a literal approach to the
definitional sections of the federal securities acts. The court noted that
both the federal securities laws and the Supreme Court had invited in-
quiry into "context." s2 The court then distinguished Weaver"' and found
that the Howey test was not applicable to debt instruments. Finally, the
" 549 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1982), appeal dismissed, 721 P.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985).
" 549 F. Supp. at 842.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 841.
Wolf. v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, __
U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985).
"' 549 F. Supp. at 843-44. The court chided both parties for their "arid literalism." Id. at
843.
83 549 F. Supp. at 845. The court noted that the decision in Weaver had relied in large
part on the existence of abundant protections under the federal banking laws. These protec-
tions were not available to the purchaser of a certificate of deposit from a Mexican Bank. In
addition, the court noted that the plaintiff in Wolf was subject to risks not present in
Weaver, i.e., the greater risk of a currency devaluation. Id.
84 Id. at 846-47. Although Forman had stated that the Howey test "in shorthand form
embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a
security," the district court noted that Weaver was the first one in which the Supreme
1984-85]
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court considered both the "commercial-investment" test and the "risk
capital" test and rejected both as inadequate."5
The final and possibly most significant portion of the district court's
opinion is an attempt to synthesize prior case law into a "framework for
decision that accommodates the universe of instruments and transac-
tions.""6 The result was a framework for deciding what is not a security:
The most direct and reliable approach to deciding cases . . .
involving instruments or transactions that unquestionably exhibit
the elements most commonly associated with securities is to in-
clude them within the meaning of a "security" unless they fall
into certain well defined categories. This approach is consonant
with the structure of the definitional provisions of the Acts, ac-
cording to which virtually any transaction in which one person
provides funds to another with the expectation of gain is a secur-
ity unless "the context otherwise requires."87
The court read prior case law to establish
[tihat a transaction in which one person ["the investor"] provides
funds to another with the expectation of a financial or economic
benefit is a security unless:
(a) the benefit derives largely from the managerial efforts of
the investor; or
(b) the investor receives something of intrinsic value which he
intends to use or consume; or
(c) the provider of funds is in the business of lending funds in
such transactions; or
(d) the person to whom the investor provides funds is merely
the investor's agent; or
(e) the transaction is virtually risk-free to the investor by rea-
son of government regulation.8
Applying this analytical framework to the facts of Wolf, the district
Court had considered the status of a debt intrument. The district court pointed out that the
Court in Weaver did not rely on the Howey test in reaching its decision. Id. at 846.
11 Id. at 847-50. The district court rejected the "commercial/investment" test as provid-
ing "little or no guidance to transacting parties and lower courts." Id. at 847. It recognized
that the "risk capital" test had never been endorsed by the Supreme Court, but did not
believe that this precluded it from considering the test. It rejected the risk capital test be-
cause it felt a "risk capital analysis could not yield a principled decision in [the] case." Id.
at 850. For a brief overview of the different approaches federal courts have taken in deter-
mining whether one form of debt instrument, the promissory note, is a security, see Note,
Bank Certificates of Deposit: Notes Not in Tune With Securities Regulation, 10 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 469, 478-86 (1982).
" 549 F. Supp. at 850.
SI Id.
Id. at 850-52.
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court found that only the exclusion based on the risk-free nature of the
transaction as a result of government regulation arguably was applicable.
The court conceded that Mexican Banks were regulated thoroughly and
that no Mexican bank had become insolvent in fifty years. However, the
court concluded that governmental regulation of Mexican banks did not
eliminate the most significant risk to investors of time deposits in foreign
banks, i.e., the risk of devaluation of the local currency. 9
The approach adopted by the court is interesting in that a security may
exist if the instrument or transaction falls within the literal language of
the statute, unless the instrument or transaction definitely can be placed
within an accepted exclusion. 0 The five categories that the court estab-
lished as exclusions are intended to give meaning to the statutory lan-
guage "unless the context otherwise requires."
The first category of exclusion, involving situations in which the benefit
derives largely from the managerial efforts of the investor, can be justi-
fied by references to the Howey test.9 ' That test requires an expectation
of profit from the effort of others; the court referred to franchises as com-
monly falling outside the definition of security on the basis that any ben-
efit is generally in substantial part a function of the investor's efforts.92
The court's first exclusion is likely to meet with general approval. One
commentator has stated:
To me this participation in the management of the investment is
the key to the entire concept of the securities acts . . . . If the
investor shares in the management of the project and the deci-
sions which determine whether the investment is a success or fail-
ure, then he does not need the protection of the securities acts
because he is the master of his own destiny, and his position gives
him the right to demand all the information necessary to make
the appropriate business decisions. But when he does not have
such a right and is dependent on the judgment of another, then
he needs protection.
9 3
" Id. at 852-53.
The approach of the court might not appear novel to many attorneys who probably
follow a similar approach in advising their clients. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 5, at
249 ("In advising clients on proposed promotions, counsel would be well advised to treat the
matter as if there were a rebuttable presumption that the promotion involved a security
.... "); Cf. Newton, supra note 10, at 173 ("If any doubt exists, counsel should either ob-
tain an SEC opinion or comply with the relevant registration requirements."). See generally
SMITH, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 93-96 (West 1981).
" See supra text accompanying note 13.
" 549 F. Supp. at 851 n.14.
" Long, Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security. Some Pragmatic Consider-
ations, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96, 120 (1974). See also Coffey, supra note 10, at 396 ("The danger
of fraud being practiced on the buyer is considerably reduced when his initial investment is
subjected to the risks of an enterprise with which he is familiar at the time of the transac-
tion and over which he exercises management control.").
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One difficulty with the court's formulation of this exclusion is that it does
not clearly answer the question of whether this exclusion would be in-
operable in certain cases simply because of the manner in which the
transaction is structured, for example, through the sale of stock. This is
currently one of the points of contention in the argument, discussed be-
low, as to the validity of the sale-of-business doctrine.'
The second category of exclusion, where the investor receives some-
thing of intrinsic value intended to be used or consumed, can be justified
by reference to the Forman decision. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that shares in a housing cooperative were not securities and pointed
out that the "investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring
a place to live, and not by financial returns on their investments." 5 As a
general proposition, commentators are not likely to dispute the court's
second exclusion, which can be justified as being based on the purchaser's
right of control over the purchased item." If this is true then, as with the
first exclusion, any profits are due to his or her own efforts. Thus, there is
no need for the application of the securities laws because the purchaser is
the master of his or her own destiny.
In other cases, one could argue that, as in Forman, the purchaser lacks
A number of cases support the position that if the investor retains ultimate control, then
there is no investment contract. See, e.g., Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir.
1978)(purchase of apartment complex and contemporaneous entering of a management con-
tract is not a security; purchaser retained ultimate control over apartment complex); Fargo
v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976); Dubin v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, [19823 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 1 99,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(nondiscre-
tionary options trading account in which investor selected underlying securities is not a
security). In addition, a number of cases applying the sale of business doctrine would sup-
port this exclusion. The purchaser, according to several of these cases, has not purchased a
security because of his or her ability after purchase to manage the corporate assets. See, e.g.,
Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). Weaver
would also seem to lend support to this exclusion. In Weaver, the Court noted that the
Weavers had retained a measure of control over the operation of the slaughterhouse that
was "not characteristic of a security." 455 U.S. at 560.
" See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
See Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Newton,
supra note 10, at 181 ("The distinction between an expectation of profit and consumption
lies in the purchaser's right of control over the purchased item. Consumption exists where
the purchaser has the right or motivation to control and exploit the purchased item."); Tew
& Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters
of the Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities Pur-
chaser, 17 U. MIAMi L. REV. 407, 422 (1973)("The key is that if one takes possession and
exploits his purchase, then any profits that eventually accrue will be due to his own efforts.
He will remain in control of his chances for success.").
One potential objection to the court's second exclusion, as phrased, is that it arguably
fails to take into account the possibility of a mixed or dual motive. Cf. Carney & Fraser,
supra note 42, at 109-10 ("Often the commodity or property purchase can serve as a dual
purpose of investment and consumption.") The court does not indicate how it would treat
the mixed motive situation.
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a profit motive and simply is not an investor; rather, he or she is a con-
sumer. Since the securities acts were intended to be investor protection
and not consumer protection acts, the purchaser simply does not come
within the intended scope of the acts.
9 7
The third category of exclusion focuses on situations in which the pro-
vider of the funds is in the business of lending funds for such transac-
tions. The court stated: "This accounts for most cases in which the courts
have wrestled with some form of the commercial-investment
dichotomy."98
This exclusion appears to have been inspired in large part by the con-
curring opinion of Judge Wright in Great Western Bank & Trust v.
Kotz,99 a case which is discussed by the district court in Wolf.' In Kotz,
Judge Wright stated that commercial loans by banks are generally not
investments:
In an investment situation, the issuer has superior access to
and control of information material to the investment decision.
Rather than relying solely on semi-anonymous second hand mar-
ket information, as do most investors, the commercial bank deals
"face-to-face" with the promissor. The bank has a superior bar-
gaining position and can compel wide-ranging disclosures and
verification of issues material to its decision on the loan applica-
tion . . . .Far from purchasing an instrument whose terms were
fixed prior to the time of its offering, the bank negotiated the
terms of the note in question.'
Thus, this exclusion may be likewise justifiable on the basis of the lack of
need for protection. A party in the business of lending funds is apt to
have the ability and means to fend for itself.
It is also worth noting that the concurring opinion of Judge Wright was
cited in the Weaver opinion.102 Judge Wright's concurrence discusses
"face-to-face" bargaining and lack of fixed terms in the commercial loan
situation. It is interesting to recall that "one-on-one" bargaining and
"unique" terms were important factors leading the Weaver Court to find
that the agreement was not a security. 0 3 In summary, Weaver seems to
support the third exclusion in Wolf.
" See, e.g., Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind.
1976)(Food and freezer plans not securities, being neither purchased or sold as investments);
Cf. Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982)("We must ask in other words what
class of people Congress wanted to protect by enacting the Securities Exchange Act ....
The answer is not in doubt: investors.").
"' 549 F. Supp. at 851 n.16.
"' 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
,o 549 F. Supp. at 851 n.16.
532 F.2d at 1262.
... 455 U.S. at 560 n.10.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
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The fourth category of exclusion covers situations in which the person
to whom the investor provides funds is the investor's agent. The court
cited general partnership interests, inter alia, as falling within this exclu-
sion'04 which can be justified by the principal's right of control over the
agent:
If the promoter is a mere agent of the investor, the investor's suc-
cess is not dependent upon the efforts of others. Instead, the for-
tunes of the investor, by virtue of his right to control his
agent-the promotor-are dependent solely upon the investor's
personal efforts. On the other hand, if the promoter vis-a-vis the
investor is a principal, the investor has no right to control his ac-
tivities. Accordingly, the investor's fortunes would be dependent
upon the efforts of others."0 5
Thus, the agency exclusion can ultimately be distilled down to lack of a
need for protection as a result of the principal's control over his or her
agent. Presumably, the investor in this situation is the master of his or
her own destiny.
The fifth and final exclusion, situations in which the transaction is vir-
tually risk-free to the investor as a result of governmental regulation, is
clearly inspired in large part by the Weaver decision. "The rationale
which appears to underlie Weaver is that government regulation suffi-
ciently mitigates the risks to which the investor is exposed to obviate the
need to apply the securities acts.' 0 6 The decision in Daniel would seem
to lend additional support to the court's final exclusion, although it was
not discussed or cited by the court. 01
Significantly, the district court in Wolf spoke of governmental regula-
tion and not federal regulation. Both Weaver and Daniel involved feder-
ally regulated areas. The district court discussed the Forman decision,
apparently as support for a broader governmental regulation exclusion.
According to the Wolf court, in Forman
the Court, in a footnote, rejected the application of the "risk capi-
tal" approach to the facts of the case because the purchasers of
the apartments "take no risk in any significant sense"; if dissatis-
549 F. Supp. at 852 n.17. See also infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
,00 Newton, supra note 10, at 177. One question about the court's fourth exclusion is
whether the existence of multiple principals will render the agency exclusion inapplicable.
Cf. Tew & Freedman, supra note 96, at 415-18 (suggesting that the existence of multiple
principals diminishes the control of any one investor over his or her fortunes, and may re-
sult in existence of a security). The exclusion of some multipleprincipal situations from the
court's agency exclusion would prevent the withdrawal of the protections of the federal se-
curities laws in situations where the investors in fact were not in control of their own
destinies.
'o 549 F. Supp. at 852 n.18.
'o7 See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
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fied, they could recover their initial investment, and state regula-
tion and nearly total state financing made bankruptcy an "un-
realistic possibility."' 0
One can question whether the fifth exclusion as stated by the court is
too broad or, rather, too narrow. Should prior Supreme Court decisions
be read to exempt from coverage of the federal securities laws only those
transactions subject to extensive federal regulation, or is extensive state,
local, or even foreign governmental regulation equally potent to override
application of the federal securities acts to transactions within their lit-
eral scope? 0 9 Conversely, are only those transactions which are risk-free
as a result of governmental regulation excluded, or are transactions which
are risk-free as a result of other factors such as insurance also ex-
cluded?" ' In any event, what is clear is that the fifth exclusion, like the
other four, is ultimately grounded in a perceived lack of need for the pro-
tections of the federal securities acts.
The approach taken by the district court in Wolf is easily understood
in light of the continuing confusion as to what constitutes a security. The
court adopted the philosophy that anything within the literal statutory
definition is assumed to be a security unless proven otherwise. As a plan-
ning matter, the approach taken by the court is a very prudent one."'
The term "security" is in essence given a negative definition, or more ac-
curately, is defined through a process of exclusion." 2
The major problem in adopting this approach is how to determine with
some degree of certainty what the exclusions to security status are. It is
not entirely clear that the exclusions listed in Wolf are exhaustive, or that
they are not either over- or under-inclusive." 3 For example, there is no
exclusion for unique, privately negotiated interests not adaptable to pub-
" 549 F. Supp. at 853. But see Forman, 421 U.S. at 867-69 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)(existence of state regulation is not a ground for excluding application of federal securi-
ties laws).
"' The court of appeals decision in Wolf, for example, held that adequate foreign govern-
mental regulation of banks would result in a finding that a certificate of deposit was not a
security. See infra text accompanying notes 11921. See also infra note 110.
- See, e.g., Note, The Definition of Security: Marine Bank v. Weaver, 24 B.C.L. REV.
1053, 1077 (1983)("the court [in Weaver] demonstrated that if there is federal legislation
and/or an insurance scheme sufficiently protective of investments that it eliminates investor
risk, the investment in question will not qualify as a security for purposes of the federal
security acts.").
See supra note 90.
The approach of defining by a process of exclusion has been used in other contexts in
which it is difficult to define a term or phrase affirmatively. For example, the phrase "trans-
acting business in this state" is defined in the Model Business Corporation Act and many
state corporation laws by listing a number of activities that will not be considered to be
transacting business in the state. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 106 (1971). See also
OKLA, STAT. tit. 19, § 1.199 (1981).
... See, e.g., supra notes 105, 109-10 and accompanying text.
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lic trading. Weaver, however, clearly suggests the existence of just such
an exclusion.'" It would seem that for the Wolf approach to be of value,
one must be comfortable that all the appropriate exclusions have been
explicitly identified and that no inappropriate ones have been included.
Given the state of the case law, one must seriously question whether this
is possible.
2. The Court of Appeals Decision
The district court decision in Wolf was overturned by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in a brief but interesting opinion." 5 The parties had
apparently offered the court a number of tests, such as the "economic
reality" test, the "risk capital" test, and the "commercial/investment"
test. The court, however, viewed the Weaver case as dispositive."'
The court of appeals considered the amendments to the definition of
the term "security" in both the Securities Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act since the Weaver decision. Those amendments added the fol-
lowing words to the definitional sections of both Acts: "any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities .... .""I Those amendments, however, were
not dispositive of the question raised in Wolf. "The legislative history
demonstrates that Congress recognized the validity of the precise holding
of Weaver on its facts, but at the same time, it also recognized that a
different outcome might result in another context.""'
Ultimately, the court held that the district court had read Weaver too
narrowly, particularly when overemphasizing the fact that the bank had
been federally regulated. The court of appeals stated: "We think that the
Court found it significant that the issuing bank was regulated, and regu-
lated adequately, not that it was the federal government that had regu-
lated it.""' The court also pointed out that the federal banking regula-
tions, so important to the decision in Weaver, would not have protected a
depositor in an American bank from the risk of devaluation.' 0
The court of appeals essentially read Weaver as standing for the pro-
position that if a bank is so well regulated that there is no risk that insol-
vency will prevent it from repaying holders of its certificates of deposit in
" See supra notes 58-60, 71-76 and accompanying text. See also First National Bank &
Trust v. Thoele, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,854 (W.D. Okla.
1982)(which seems to support the view that such an exclusion exists).
"' Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, __
U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985).
,15 Id. at 1461.
'17 See Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97303, §§ 1 2, 96 Stat. 1409 (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 77(b) & 78(c)(West Supp. 1983)).
739 F.2d at 1463.
"' Id. at 1462.
12 Id.
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full, then the certificate is not a security under federal securities laws.' 2 '
The court did not read Weaver as requiring that this regulation be fed-
eral regulation, as opposed to foreign governmental regulation, or per-
haps, even though the court does not address the question, state regula-
tion. Moreover, although the court was of the opinion that the burden of
proving the existence of such regulation should fall on the bank, it was
conceded in Wolf that the Mexican government's regulation of Mexican
banks offered the same degree of protection to certificate holders as fed-
eral regulation of domestic banks does in this country. Thus, the court
concluded that the Mexican certificates of deposit were not securities.' 22
The court of appeals decision does not make reference to the list of
exclusions from security status that the district court attempted to for-
mulate. Still, the decision indicates that, at minimum, the district court's
fifth exclusion, where the transaction is virtually risk-free to the investor
by reason of governmental regulation, must be read to include regulation
by foreign governments.' 2
In addition, while the Ninth Circuit overruled the decision of the dis-
trict court as to the facts, its approach is basically consistent with that of
the lower court. The court of appeals was willing to look closely at the
investor's need for protection in determining whether or not the instru-
ment or transaction involved was a security.
B. Brockton
In Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 4 the
plaintiff Brockton sought to recover from the auditors of Penn Square
Bank losses sustained as a result of the purchase of a $1,000,000 certifi-
cate of deposit from the now-defunct bank. A federal district court
granted the auditor's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's security law claims
on the ground that the certificate was not a security within the meaning
of the federal securities laws. The plaintiff seized upon the footnote in
the Weaver opinion allowing that a certificate of deposit does not invaria-
bly fall outside the definition of "security" under the federal securities
laws and stressing the need for a case-by-case analysis. 25 Using this "toe-
"' Id. at 1463. The decision of the court of appeals is generally consistent with the posi-
tion taken in an article written prior to the Supreme Court's Weaver decision. See Kron-
stein, The C.D. Muddle, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 395, 39798 (1982). Kronstein argued for a distinc-
tion between the certificates of issuers generally recognized as banks in the international
banking community, and those issued by an institution which called itself a bank, but which
was in reality a "highly speculative investment scheme taking advantage of the lax banking
regulations in out-of-the-way jurisdictions." Id. at 398.
"1 739 F.2d at 1463-64.
1"3 See supra text accompanying notes 109-10, 113.
577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983).
455 U.S. at 560 n.11.
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hold,"' 26 the plaintiff fashioned a number of arguments in an attempt to
distinguish its situation from that of the plaintiffs in Weaver.
The Brockton court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it had not
purchased an ordinary certificate of deposit, but instead had made an
investment in a common enterprise consisting of Penn Square Bank and
its oil and gas borrowers. Even as characterized, the plaintiffs investment
failed what the court referred to as the "Forman" test. 27 The court did
not accept the plaintiffs argument that the Forman test did not apply to
debt instruments.2 8 The risk capital test the plaintiff was advocating had
never been endorsed by the Supreme Court, and in any event, the plain-
tiff's certificate of deposit would fail even the risk capital test.129 The
court also rejected plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Weaver on the basis
that the certificate in that case had a face value of only $50,000, while in
Brockton the certificate had a face value of $1,000,000, far in excess of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's insurance ceiling. 10
The court was similarly unimpressed with Brockton's attempt to distin-
guish Weaver as involving a suit against a bank, heavily regulated by fed-
eral banking regulations. Brockton, in comparison, was attempting to sue
a bank's auditors who are not subject to federal banking regulations."'1
The court was of the opinion that a certificate must be a security as to
everyone or no one, but that it could not be a security as to some persons
and not as to others. "The instrument in question must be found to be a
security before recovery under the securities laws can be sought for the
alleged fraud of accountants, bankers or anyone else involved with the
"I This is the court's characterization of Brockton's efforts.
'"7 577 F. Supp. at 1284. It is clear from the opinion that in referring to the Forman test,
the court essentially is discussing the elements of the Howey test. Id. Applying these ele-
ments to the facts, the court stated:
[W]hen Brockton purchased the CD, it could not have had any "reasonable expec-
tation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others." Rather, the bank could have expected nothing more than the return of its
deposit with interest at a contracted rate; such a return was not dependent at all
upon the issuer's profits.
Id.
Id. at 1284-85.
"I Id. at 1285. The court stated the Brockton's risk was as a depositor. Brockton faced
only the risk that the bank would become solvent, and not the risk that the principal value
of its investment would decline. Citing Weaver, the court mentioned the virtually complete
assurance of repayment that bank depositors enjoy. Id.
13 Id. The plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's comment in Weaver that the "pur-
chaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually guaranteed payment in full" should be read to
exclude certificates of deposit up to the ceiling of federal deposit insurance from coverage
under federal securities laws. Id. (quoting Weaver, 455 U.S. at 568). The court held that
Brockton misconstrued the Weaver decision and that the payment in full language was a
reference to the historical fact that payment in full has generally been received for the unin-
sured as well as the insured portion of bank deposits in failed banks and not to insurance
coverage. Id.
' Id.
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instrument."' 2 Finally, the court was not moved by the plaintiff's conten-
tion that since Weaver required a case-by-case factual analysis, a motion
to dismiss the action was inappropriate. '
The Brockton decision is interesting for a number of reasons. First, un-
like the district court in Wolf, the Brockton court decided that the
Howey test is applicable to debt instruments.13 4 Second, the rationale of
Weaver was found to be dispositive; however, the court did not give much
consideration to the application of that rationale to the plaintiff's situa-
tion. In Weaver the Supreme Court noted: "Since its formation in 1933,
nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by the FDIC have received
payment in full, even payment for the portions of their deposits above the
amount insured.""'3 The Court, however, added that:
It does not follow [that a] certificate of deposit ... invariably
falls outside the definition of a security as defined by the federal
statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the
basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes
intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.'
The court in Brockton was unwilling to consider the factual differences
between Weaver and Brockton: 1) Weaver did not actually involve a bank
that had become insolvent, while Brockton did; 2) the certificate in
Weaver was substantially within the FDIC ceiling on insured deposits,
while the certificate in Brockton far exceeded the ceiling; and 3) large
depositors in Penn Square Bank apparently stood to lose a substantial
portion of their principal, unlike the situation in prior failures of FDIC
insured banks.'37 This last factor is the most significant. Brockton treats
the Supreme Court's statement about prior failure of FDIC-insured banks
as dispositive of the need for analysis of the facts in future cases involv-
ing certificates of deposit. This approach, however, seems to ignore sev-
eral considerations. One is the Supreme Court's statement that certifi-
cates of deposit may be securities under the right circumstances;
therefore, a case-by-case analysis of each factual setting may be neces-
sary. The other is the possibility that the Supreme Court's conclusion as
to the safety of the uninsured portion of bank deposits and the adequacy
' Id. at 1286.
,.3 Id. In support of this argument Brockton cited the district court's decision in Wolf.
The court distinguished Wolf as involving a foreign bank, stating that banking regulation
does not protect against the risk of currency devaluation. Therefore, the district court deci-
sion in Wolf was read as holding that the rationale of Weaver was inapplicable as a result of
the unique facts. The court in Brockton found that the rationale of Weaver was fully appli-
cable to the facts of the case. Id. As discussed above, the district court decision in Wolf was
subsequently overruled on appeal. See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
I3' See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
455 U.S. at 558 (citing 1980 FDIC ANN. REP. 1821).
, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11.
," See supra note 57.
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of federal regulation of banks may be wrong if facts not available at the
time of Weaver are taken into consideration.'
The Weaver decision immediately preceded the collapse of Penn
Square Bank. In that failure and several failures since then, it appears as
if uninsured depositors stand to lose a significant portion of their princi-
pal.'" In addition, as a result of the Penn Square failure and the subse-
quent and not totally unrelated problems of Continental Illinois Bank,
the adequacy of federal regulation of banking has been questioned.'""
A final interesting aspect of the court's decision is its rejection of the
notion that a security could exist as to one party, e.g., an auditor, and not
as to another, e.g., a bank. The court, concluding its discussion of the
status of Brockton's certificate, stated: "Brockton may be able to allege
that it purchased a car with no motor and that the seller was a crook, but
it cannot show that the car it purchased was 'in effect' a bicycle."' 41 The
question of whether an instrument can be a security as to one person and
'1* It is clear that a lower court should follow Supreme Court interpretation of statutes.
One court has stated: "The doctrine of stare decisis, weighty in any context, is especially so
in matters of statutory construction .... iTihe bar and the public are justified in expect-
ing the courts, except in the most egregious cases, neither to depart from previous interpre-
tations of statutes, nor to give them a grudging application." Cottrell v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 628 F.2d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 1980). The problem is that the Weaver
opinion is written in such a manner as to be of virtually no value on facts materially differ-
ent from those before the Court. See infra text accompanying notes 194-95. Thus, by con-
sidering factual differences and the need for protection arising from the particular facts of a
case, a lower court would be doing exactly what the Court in Weaver instructed.
"I' One reason appears to be a change in policy by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration which appears to have adopted an approach designed to discourage large depositors
from placing their deposits in poorly run banks by no longer attempting to protect unin-
sured deposits. See Big Depositors at 2 Failed Banks May Lose Some Funds Due to New
FDIC Approach, Wall St.J., Mar. 19, 1984, at 3, col. 2 & 3 (S.W. ed); FDIC Action on Bank
Failures Continues Step to Make Big Depositors Pay for Errors, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1984,
at 14, col. 2 & 3 (S.W. ed). See also Wall St. J., April 30, 1984, at 4, cols. 2 & 3 (S.W. ed);
Wall St. J., August 22, 1984, at 29, col. 46 (S.W. ed.). Apparently, however, the policy will
not effect the 11 largest banks in the United States, which the federal government has de-
cided are too large to allow to fail. See U.S. Won't Let 11 Biggest Banks in National Fail,
Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1984, at 2, col. 2 & 3 (S.W. ed).
"o See Federal Supervision and Failure of the Penn Square Bank, Oklahoma City,
Okla.: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (statement of chairman Rosenthal); Penn Square Failure: Hearing before
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (Part 1), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
11115 (statements of chairman St. Germain); Comptroller Will Face Tough Queries by
House Panel on Continental Illinois, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 12, col. 1 & 2 (S.W. ed);
Regulators Charged With "Timid" Action on Continental Illinois in House Hearings, Wall
St. J., Sept. 19, 1984, at 12, col. 1 & 2 (S.W. ed.).
141 577 F. Supp. at 128687 (citing the defendants' characterization of Brockton's argu-
ment). See also Darrell, Redefining a "Security": Is The Sale of a Business Through a
Stock Transfer Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 12 SEc. REG. L.J. 22, 52
(1984)("Shares of stock, unlike lizards, are not chameleons. Just as a leopard cannot change
its spots, an instrument cannot change its status as a security depending on who holds it.").
(Vol. 33:449
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not as to another is quite fascinating. At first glance, the answer might
appear self-evident. A car is a car and not a bicycle, or in other words,
property should be judged on its intrinsic qualities and not on extrinsic
factors such as the identity or a characteristic of the buyer or seller, or
the method of sale.
There is, on the other hand, substantial authority for the contrary pro-
position. 142 The general rule holds that an interest in a general partner-
ship is not a security, 143 however, a number of courts have recently articu-
lated exceptions to this general rule. Perhaps the best known case is
Williamson v. Tucker,1" in which the court stated:
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated
a security if the investor can establish, for example, that (1) an
agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands
of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distrib-
utes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business af-
fairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partner-
ship or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so depen-
dent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the
enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or ven-
ture powers."'
The second exception clearly looks to qualities of the purchaser rather
than to the nature of the instrument to answer the question of the status
of the interest for the purposes of federal securities laws. The third ex-
ception also appears to examine the characteristics of the seller or some
other person, to determine the status of the instrument. The Williamson
',' The district court in Wol/ seemed to accept the possibility that an instrument could
be a security as to one person and not as to another. It is stated, in a footnote: "That an
instrument presumptively a security is treated as exempt when issued because of the protec-
tion afforded the investor through government regulation in that transaction does not neces-
sarily mean that it should also be exempt in later transactions in which no such protection
is afforded." 549 F. Supp. at 852 n.18.
"I See Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983)("Normally, a general partner-
ship interest is not considered a 'security.' "); Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545
F. Supp. 1314, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)("General partnerships or joint ventures are unlikely to
come within federal securities jurisdiction .... ); R. JENNINGS & J. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION 252 (4th ed. 1977)("An interest in a joint venture or general partnership nor-
mally is the antithesis of an 'investment contract' or 'profit sharing agreement.' "). See gen-
erally Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities,
37 Mo. L. REV. 581 (1972); Annot., 58 A.L.R. FED. 408 (1982).
144 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). The court stated that an
investor who claims that his general partnership interest is a security has a difficult burden
to overcome, but held that the plaintiffs' claims were not so insubstantial as to warrant
dismissal by the trial court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
' 645 F.2d at 424.
1984-851
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
decision, and others like it, 4" clearly leave open the possibility that an
interest sold to an inexperienced or unknowledgeable individual will be
labeled a security, while an interest in the same venture sold to a knowl-
edgeable or experienced individual will not.
A similar phenomenon is possible in those circuits in which the "sale-
of-business" doctrine has been adopted. This doctrine essentially holds
that the purchase of all, or even a majority, of the stock of a corporation
with the intent to manage the business is not a purchase of a security
within the meaning of the federal securities laws.1 7 The doctrine appears
to be based on the fact that in this situation, the purchaser of stock is not
an investor but is rather an entrepreneur; he or she is in reality purchas-
ing the assets of a business with the purpose of managing those assets.'
Thus, the sale of stock is merely incidental to a sale of assets.
The sale-of-business doctrine also leaves open the possibility that the
same interest may be a security as to one person and not as to another.'49
For example, assume that in a single transaction a purchaser acquires all
of the stock of a corporation from twenty shareholders, each of whom
owns five percent of the outstanding stock. The purchaser intends to as-
sume an active role in the management of the business. Under the doc-
trine, it is likely that the purchaser will be held not to have purchased a
I"8 See, e.g., McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., [1983-84] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
99,538 (N.D. Cal.); Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)(both follow the Williamson approach). But cf. the opinion of Judge Garth in Goodwin
v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984). Judge
Garth refers to the exceptions in Williamson as obiter dictum, and rejects the notion that it
is possible for a general partnership interest to be a security. He would hold as a matter of
law that a general partnership interest is not a security. Two judges concurred with Garth as
to the court's judgment but not as to all of his analysis in the case.
"I There have been numerous recent cases involving the question of the legitimacy of the
sale-of-business doctrine. The federal courts of appeals have divided on this question. Com-
pare, e.g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982)(reaffirming the adoption of the
doctrine in the Seventh Circuit), with Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227
(2d. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2231, appeal dismissed, __ U.S. ___
105 S. Ct. 25 (1984)(reaffirming rejection of the doctrine in the Second Circuit).
The commentators are also deeply divided on the validity of the doctrine. Compare Seldin,
When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 37 Bus. LAw 637 (1982)(approving of the doctrine), with Karajala, supra note 35
(disapproving of doctrine).
'48 Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982). The meaningfulness of the investor-
entrepreneur dichotomy has been questioned. "The distinction between an 'entrepreneur
and an 'investor' is hardly obvious. Many investors may elect to participate in the manage-
ment of a business in order to enhance their return on investment; indeed, in our free-
enterprise system that is to be expected . . . . It seems clear to us that these persons are
both investors and entrepreneurs." Reufenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted sub nor. Gould v. Reufenacht, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 428 (1984).
"' One author states that "courts upholding the sale of business doctrine have introduced
a disconcerting asymmetry into securities transactions in that one party may be dealing in a
security while the other is not." Karajala, supra note 35, at 429.
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security. Instead he or she has, in effect, purchased the assets of the busi-
ness to manage and thus is unable to bring suit under the anti-fraud pro-
visions of the federal securities laws for any material misrepresentations
or omissions in connection with the purchase. The sellers, however, are
likely to be treated otherwise; they will be conceptualized as having
parted with investments in the corporate entity rather than with pro rata
shares of the corporation assets.'50
V. JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENT ON OVERRIDING QUESTIONS OF POLICY: A
CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE CONFUSION
One source of the current confusion over the scope of the definition of
"security" is a disagreement about how much judicial time and effort
should be spent identifying those cases believed to be outside the pur-
poses of the securities acts. A sample of the different views on this sub-
ject is apparent in the colloquy between the Second and the Seventh Cir-
cuits on the sale-of-business doctrine. The Second Circuit held that
corporate stock is a security even when the purchaser is an entrepreneur
purchasing assets to manage. In Golden v. Garafalo,' 5' Judge Winter,
writing for the majority, stated that "the dangers of creating uncertainty
as to the scope of the Acts and in generating slippery legal and factual
issues going to jurisdiction are substantial."''5 Judge Winter accepted the
argument that the Second Circuit's rejection of the sale-of-business doc-
trine resulted "in a certain overbreadth in application."' 53 The Judge was
not, however, particularly concerned about this; apparently he perceived
this overbreadth to be the product of a conscious legislative choice. 54
In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit stated in Sutter v.
Groen:"5
The problem of drawing lines was the principal reason given by
The possibility that the same interest might be a security as to one party and not as to
another has not gone unrecognized by the federal courts. See, e.g., Ruefenacht, 737 F.2d at
320. In rejecting the sale-of-business doctrine, the court in Ruefenacht pointed out that
under the doctrine:
Instruments purchased by multiple investors might be securities as to some pur-
chasers and nonsecurities as to others, or securities as to sellers hut not as to
purchasers. Instruments might be securities if traded in a series of small transac-
tions but nonsecurities if the same transaction is effectuated in a single sale.
Id. at 331-32. Even proponents of the doctrine have recognized the apparent strangeness of
this phenomenon. See, e.g., Seldin, supra note 147, at 681 n.107 (where the author attempts
to argue that the "strangeness of this result is largely superficial").
"' 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
"' Id. at 1146. Cf. Dillport, supra note 10, at 121 ("The orderly administration of the
Acts will become unmanageable . . . if the status of an instrument as a security is deter-
mined on the basis of the transaction in which it transferred").
678 F.2d at 1146.
,5 Id. See infra note 173.
687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
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the Second Circuit in Golden for rejecting the sale of business
doctrine .... We agree that the costs of administering legal
rules are a proper concern in designing those rules. But rarely will
a net savings in those costs be produced by expanding liability,
since even if the legal standard will be simpler and therefore
cheaper to apply in each case the number of potential cases in
which it will be applied will be greater. And if there were some
net cost savings we doubt they could justify expanding liability to
reach substantive evils far outside the scope of the legislature's
concern. 156
The Seventh Circuit, thus indicated a willingness to engage in case-by-
case analysis, if necessary, to determine whether application of the fed-
eral securities laws would be consistent with the purposes behind those
laws i.e., the protection of investors.
To the extent that a literal approach to the definition of a security is
rejected, the need for a case-by-case analysis may be unavoidable. If the
Howey test is viewed as universal, applicable to interests specifically
listed in the statutory definitions as well as the catch-all phrases, then
the federal judiciary can expect to expend a far greater amount of time
and energy on the sifting process.15 7
"I Id. at 202. It has been suggested that "the costs of legal rules accrue not only to the
courts but to those members of the public who must structure their affairs accordingly."
Reufenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 332 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub noma. Gould v.
Ruefenacht, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 428 (1984). Perhaps this cost is not adequately reflected
in the calculations of the Seventh Circuit in Sutter v. Groen. The court in Ruefenacht
stated that under the sale of business doctrine:
Counsel must be hired to predict whether the purchase of a large block of stock
will render it a security or a nonsecurity. Doubts will be created over whether
registrations are necessary. All of this uncertainty has real economic costs ....
That uncertainty raises the cost of economic transactions, inhibits the flow of cap-
ital, spawns litigation, and in general benefits neither the parties or the courts.
737 F.2d at 332-33.
On the other hand, the regulations imposed upon an interest found to be a security may
raise the costs of its promotion and sale. One author states:
Those costs may pose entry barriers that some businessmen will be unwilling or
unable to bear; and, if fewer persons engage in a particular business activity be-
cause of these regulatory costs, we often find undesirable social consequences such
as competitive advantages that accrue to larger, more established firms to whom
the regulatory costs are not too burdensome.
Mofsky, supra note 18, at 396.
One author states:
By making the definition of security as pliable as putty, to be molded to the
facts of the particular case at hand, the courts have gone beyond interpreting the
statutes they have usurped the congressional function by rewriting the statutes in
a haphazard, ad hoc manner. Where once there stood an organized statutory
scheme, there is now a maelstrom of confusion. The effect of the courts ignoring
the plain language of the statutes is apparent: stocks are securities, but not these
stocks; notes are securities, but not these notes, and so on.
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The status of general partnership interests under the securities laws
involves the same consideration. If the Williamson v. Tucker5 8 approach
is widely adopted, in many cases a close examination of the facts will be
required before a determination can be made as to whether a particular
interest is a security."' 9 Courts will look to, inter alia, the partnership
agreement, the uniqueness of the manager's skill, and the sophistication
of the complaining partnership. Thus, significant judicial resources would
be spent in determining whether a particular situation is within or with-
out the purposes of Congress in passing the federal securities laws.
On the other hand, a recent federal circuit court opinion finding that a
general partnership was not a security chose a substantially different ap-
proach.' °0 Judge Garth of the Third Circuit examined the statutory rights
of a partner under Pennsylvania's Uniform Partnership Act and con-
cluded that "the role of a general partner, by law, extends well beyond
the permitted role of a passive investor." '161 If the approach of this court
is adopted, the task of determining the security status of the interests of
persons who are general partners within the meaning of the Uniform
Partnership Act will be simplified. The interests as a matter of law are
not securities; therefore, no substantial investment of judicial resources is
required.
Both the district court and the court of appeals decisions in Wolf
demonstrated a willingness to engage in a case-by-case analysis of the
propriety of applying the federal securities laws to certificates of deposit.
In fact, the Supreme Court in Weaver seems to encourage such an ap-
proach.1 62 The Brockton court, by comparison, was loath to embark on a
close analysis of the particular facts of the case. Weaver was treated as
dispositive of the status of a class of certificates of deposit issued by fed-
erally regulated banks, thus eliminating any need for a case-by-case
analysis.
The question of how much effort should be expended to determine
whether particular instruments or transactions are securities is inter-
twined with the issue of how much weight should be given to the form or
structure of a transaction. Should a court give conclusive effect to the
manner in which the parties have structured the transaction, or should it
expend effort and resources in an attempt to look behind the transaction?
Darrell, supra note 141, at 63. The author's opinion on the desirability of a case-by-case
approach is evident. The Supreme Court's opinion in Forman has been read by many as
rejecting a literal approach. See, e.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
118 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
e Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct.
118 (1984).
l ' 730 F.2d at 103. See supra note 146.
.6. 455 U.S. at 560 n.11.
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Again, there is no uniformity of opinion on this question.
In the sale of business area, it has been noted that parties to a transac-
tion may choose one form of a transaction, the purchase and sale of stock,
over another form, the purchase and sale of assets, "because of the conse-
quences of choosing that form, including the security law conse-
quences. 1 6' 3 In the sale of business context, it has been suggested that to
fail to respect the method in which the parties have structured the trans-
action may disappoint reasonable expectations and raise the cost of trans-
actions to the parties. 1" If a purchaser of corporate stock is unable to rely
on the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws for protection from ma-
terial misrepresentations and omissions, then other potentially costly
means of protection must be sought. '"5 Thus, the argument goes, courts
should respect the intention of the parties in structuring the deal as a sale
of stock and apply federal securities laws.
Nevertheless, it has also been suggested that the purpose of the securi-
ties acts was "to protect the passive investor, who would not ordinarily
take the same precauti6ns as one purchasing for the purposes of control
and management."'" The entrepreneur, purchasing a corporation to
manage, can "normally be expected to investigate and evaluate and not to
rely solely upon the representations of the seller without accounting and/
or legal advice.""' From this it has been concluded that "investors ought
not to believe they will be protected when they structure transactions in
order to avail themselves of protections not due them."'" Thus, the argu-
ment goes, courts should look behind the structure of the transaction to
determine whether the purchaser of stock is a passive investor or an
entrepreneur.
The same type of considerations may be involved in general partner-
113 Schwartz, Redefining "Securities": Limitations on the Scope of the Securities Laws,
14 INST. SEC. REG. 323, 324 (1983).
'6 737 F.2d at 332-33.
105 These could include "employing professionals to comb through the most intricate de-
tails of the seller's business." Id. at 333.
"'0 Colson v. Bertsch, 586 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (D.N.J. 1984).
167 Id.
,I' Id. at 1294. One author states:
Even assuming that the buyer expects the securities laws to apply to the sale of
stock, it is unfair to bind the seller to these expectations unless the buyer's expec-
tations are reasonable. This, in turn, depends on whether the transaction is one to
which the securities laws were intended to apply.
Ribstein, Securities Regulation, 34 MERCER L. REv- 1461, 1484 (1983). Ribstein writes that
"Itlhe factor that distinguishes securities transactions from other transactions is that the
buyer is investing in the managerial skills of the promoter and, therefore, needs particularly
detailed disclosures concerning the business that will permit him to evaluate the promoter's
entreprenuerial skills." Id. at 1483. He concludes that the sale of assets is not a securities
transaction, and that "it is ... difficult to understand why it should matter whether a
transfer of all of the assets of a business is structured as a sale of 'assets' or of 'stock'." Id. at
1483-84.
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ship cases where parties may have relied on nonapplication of the federal
securities laws. If courts adopt the Goodwin approach that general part-
nership interests are not securities as a matter of law, then parties would
be able to structure a transaction as a general partnership to avoid appli-
cation of the securities laws.
The sale-of-business cases are potentially distinguishable from the
cases involving general partnership interests. First, "stock" is one of the
words included in the statutory definitions of "security. '" 16 9 Thus, the
Howey test is arguably not applicable to corporate stock. 170 Partnership
interests are not specifically named in the definitions"1 and must there-
fore fall within the catch-all phrases of the definitions in order to be a
security. It is clear that a partnership interest must meet the Howey test
if it is to be a security.
Second, the federal securities laws are remedial statutes and, as such,
have historically been liberally construed. 172 Most remedial statutes prob-
ably are somewhat overbroad in application as written and/or judicially
construed." 3 This is not, however, particularly frightening; the federal se-
curities statutes address those evils intended to be remedied and, in addi-
tion, are applicable to a much smaller group of situations where the evils
intended to be remedied are probably nonexistent. Given the possibility
that significant judicial resources might be required to effectively sort the
wheat from the chaff," 4 one can argue that courts should not be particu-
larly concerned about the potential for parties to opt into security law
coverage. This is especially true since in some of the situations which the
statutes were not originally intended to cover other evils are remedied by
the application of the laws, i.e., frauds perpetrated on entrepreneurs.
The partnership cases present a different situation. It may be more ob-
jectionable to remove cases within the intent of the federal securities laws
from coverage than to include cases without the purpose of the statute. In
'' See supra notes 3 and 4.
'7 See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
'7' See supra notes 3 and 4.
.. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)(remedial pur-
poses of securities legislation); S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1952)("broadly
remedial purposes of federal securities legislation").
7' One author has concluded that the definitions of "security" in the federal securities
acts were recognized to be overinclusive at the time of their adoption:
The term [security] was defined broadly enough to bring within the coverage of
the Acts many instruments and transactions in which the need for most of the
specialized regulation of the Acts was less clear and where the public benefits to
be derived from regulation under the Acts were remote. Yet, with limited excep-
tions, the response to the overinclusiveness of the definition was to exempt securi-
ties or transactions from the more onerous requirements of the Acts, such as re-
porting and registration, but to apply the antifraud protection of the Acts to the
transactions in which the instrument was bought or sold.
Dillport, supra note 10, at 122.
... See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1982).
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other words, conscious overapplication of the securities laws may be less
objectionable than conscious under application.
A number of cases have held limited partnership interests to be securi-
ties.'7 5 A de facto limited partnership could possibly be given the trap-
pings and legal structure of a general partnership.'" It would be difficult,
however, to harmonize the purpose of the nonwaiver provisions of the
federal securities laws ' with a judicial approach permitting these de
facto limited partnerships to be used to avoid the federal securities laws.
Thus, the opting out of the coverage of securities laws may be cause for
serious concern.
The Forman case is a major obstacle in attempting to distinguish sale-
of-business cases from those involving general partnership interests. The
Supreme Court looked at more than the form of the transaction. In par-
ticular, Forman requires an examination of the economic realities of a
case to determine whether a security exists,' 8 or rather, it has been ar-
gued, determine what should be excluded from the definition of a secur-
ity.'79 Thus, structuring a transaction not intended to be covered by the
securities laws in any particular form should not be sufficient to bring it
within the definition of a security.
Another source of confusion regarding what instruments or transactions
are appropriately included within the term "security" is the question of
how far judges should go in considering perceived lack of need for protec-
tion as a factor in the decision. Again, this question is difficult to separate
from those of how much effort should be expended in sorting out non-
securities, and how much weight should be given to the form of a transac-
tion. For example, Judge Lumbard argued in his dissenting opinion in
Golden that in rejecting the sale-of-business doctrine, the "majority ex-
tend[ed] the protections of the securities laws to plaintiffs not in need of
those protections ..1.8.
"I See, e.g.. Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979)(limited partnership interest involved was a security as a matter of law); Hirsch v.
duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). See also
Long, supro note 143, at 583.
,76 Cf. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 199 (1983)("Indeed, even inter-
ests in something called a general partnership may be securities when the venture, though a
general partnership de jure, functions de facto like a limited partnership.").
"I Securities Act of 1933 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)(1982).
'T' 421 U.S. at 848-58.
'7' See Thompson, supra note 31, at 234-35. Of course, an important question here is
whether corporate stock is subject to the economic realities test. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 31-35.
-~o 696 F.2d at 230. See also Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, 696 F.2d 227, 230 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2341, appeal dismissed, - U.S. -_, 105 S. Ct.
25 (1984)(Lumbard, J., concurring and dissenting)("In this case ... no investor needs the
protection of the federal securities laws."); Vorrius v. Harvey, 570 F. Supp. 537, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)("the instant facts do not require the protection of the securities laws.").
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Considering the need for protection is not limited to sale-of-business
cases.""' In fact, it can be suggested that the whole scheme of exclusions
developed by the district court in Wolf is grounded on a perceived lack of
a need for protection in the case of instruments or transactions that fall
within the exclusions. 2 The decision of the court of appeals in Wolf is
based on the existence of the protection of Mexican banking laws. 8 3 Ad-
ditionally, the district court in Brockton appeared to borrow the Weaver
Court's comments regarding the protections of federal banking laws."8 4 It
would not be bold to suggest that recent Supreme Court decisions have
engaged in such an approach and, thus, have encouraged the lower federal
courts to do the same; Forman, Daniel, and Weaver can be read as per-
mitting just such an approach. Indeed, one author has suggested that,
based on the Weaver decision, one could infer that "the Supreme Court
would decide that a one-on-one negotiated sale of a business through a
stock transfer is not security" because of the existence of other adequate
protections in that situation.'
VI. Is THERE ANY HoPE?
At this point, one might fairly ask what can be done to dispel the con-
tinuing confusion over what is included within the term "security." The
suggestion that a careful review of Supreme Court cases would decide the
issue can now be rejected; close examination has shown that these cases
have, in part, been the source of the confusion. 86 For example, the
Court's decision in Forman must be considered a primary, albeit uninten-
tional, source of the controversy over the sale-of-business doctrine. 187 In
addition, the Howey test, which at one point stood for the proposition
"I Cf., e.g., Orbe, A Security: The Quest for a Definition, 12 SEc. REG. L.J. 220, 232
(1984). In discussing the status of loan participations under the federal securities laws, the
author states that in denying security status "[siome courts have adopted the premise that
banks do not need the protection of securities acts . He argues that this conclusion is
incorrect.
"I' See supra text accompanying notes 77-114.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 124-50.
"8 Darrell, supra note 141, at 57. The author states that this protection "is provided by
(1) the presence of an attorney at the negotiations; (2) contractual warranties; and (3) state
antifraud laws." Id. To the extent that state courts look to federal case law in defining the
term security under state law, however, the existence of protection under state securities
laws is questionable. See Karajala, supra note 35, at 438-39.
"' It is likely, however, that the parsing of such cases will continue. Cf. Seagrave Corp. v.
Vista Resources, 696 F.2d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct.
2341, appeal dismissed, - U.S. - 105 S. Ct. 25 (1984)("Like modern day beachcombers
with 'finders' rods seeking treasure beneath the sand, circuit courts cull through Supreme
Court decisions in search of a phrase to fortify their view of how 'security' is defined under
the Acts.").
'17 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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that the federal securities laws were flexible enough to comprehend novel
and unique schemes, has itself now become a source of confusion."' The
test has been described as having been converted into an inflexible stan-
dard that operates as an obstacle to securities regulation. 8 The catch-all
phrase "investment contract" may today have become a tool through
which the court can narrow generally the scope of the securities acts.'
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the definition of a
security provided precious little clear guidance except: 1) an extensive
system of federal regulation and/or federal insurance may prevent an in-
terest from being a security; and 2) certain unique instruments, negoti-
ated one-to-one and incapable of public trading are not securities. At the
same time, this decision has been criticized as being confused,1 '
grounded on potentially inaccurate information, 9 ' and giving inadequate
guidance as to when lack of need for protection, or the uniqueness of an
instrument, will justify nonapplication of the federal securities laws.' 93
One commentator has stated: "The Supreme Court's decision in
Weaver will probably resolve the security issue as it relates to certificates
of deposit, but will be of little assistance otherwise . . . ."'" Considera-
tion of the Wolf and Brockton decisions suggests that Weaver may not
even have laid to rest the general question of the status of a certificate of
deposit. In addition, the uncertainty created by this decision may gener-
ate additional litigation.9
A number of authors have written extremely thoughtful and scholarly
articles proposing redefinitions or attempting to clarify the definition of
"I One might question whether the problem is that a perfect test for the existence of a
security is simply unattainable. Cf. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 5, at 248 ("Howey has
the apparent benefit of certainty and definiteness, but the problem is that the real world is
not as simple as the Howey formula or any other formula. Therefore, the courts have been
forced to resort to devices nearly as clever as those of the entrepreneurs in order to fit the
schemes within the 'test.' ").
189 See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Se-
curities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135, 177-78 (1971)("it is time to abandon the rigid
formula which the courts have converted the Howey definition into, a situation even the
Howey court would be the first to reject, and realize that 'investment contracts' are a tool to
be used in securities regulation rather than an obstacle to such regulation."
"I See Comment, Catchall Investment Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise Re-
quire, 14 Cum. L. REv. 135, 148 (1984)("The current trend in the Supreme Court is constric-
tive. "Investment contract' no longer constitutes a regulatory snare; conversely, the term
ironically afforded the Court [in recent cases] the occasion to narrow the scope of the Secur-
ities Acts generally."). See also Orbe, supra note 181, at 243-45 (decisions as to definition of
"security" have effect of defining the jurisdiction of the federal securities laws).
191 See supra text note 75 and accompanying text.
1"' See supra text notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 110.
"' Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 38 Bus. LAW 1851, 1863 (1983).
Bunch, supra note 64, at 1042-43; Note, supra note 20, at 599.
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the term "security."' 96 These proposals are intended to offer greater pre-
dictability of results while remaining faithful to the perceived congres-
sional intent that inspired the federal securities laws. There is no ques-
tion that greater predictability of result is desirable in this area.1 7 It is
unlikely, however, that greater certainty can be obtained without action
by the Supreme Court.' 8 Scholarly reformulations of the definition are of
limited value unless the Court is willing to accept and act on the reformu-
lation. The Court expressly declined to adopt the proposed risk capital
test in Forman,"9' and the Court may have passed up another opportu-
nity to do so in Weaver.2 0 Additionally, while Weaver appears to incor-
porate elements of a recent scholarly redefinition of "security," 10' the
Court's sole reference to the article was in connection with its statement
that the Securities Exchange Act "was adopted to restore investors' confi-
dence in the financial markets."202 The Court failed to specifically ap-
prove this reformulation, casting doubt on whether this Article can pro-
vide guidance as to what the Court might consider to be a security in the
future.2 °0
Unfortunately, reasonable minds cannot agree on the definition of a
"security; '20 4 this is exemplified by the recent split among the circuits
"I See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 10; FitzGibbon, supra note 48; Hannon & Thomas, supra
note 5; Long, supra note 189; and Newton, supra note 10. One recent commentary states:
"The search [for a definition of a security] appears endless, and as the volume of literature
expands, so does the confusion." Orbe, supra note 181, at 221.
- See Karjala, supra note 35, at 437 ("Securities law affects thousands of transactions
every day .... The difficulties posed by unclear and unpredictable rules and case law need
not be elaborated."); Newton, supra note 10, at 167 ("Over forty years after the adoption of
the [federal securities acts], the controversy surrounding what constitutes a security still
rages .... [Firom the pragmatic viewpoint of counsel whose client proposes to raise funds
by a public offering, this matter mandates clarity, not confusion."); Cf. Long. supra note 93,
at 96 ("It is interesting that in the more than 60 years of securities regulation in this coun-
try, we still have no clearly accepted definition of a security.").
As might be expected, the value of a clear and predictable definition of a security has not
escaped mention by the courts. See, e.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir.
1982); Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 734 F.2d 320, 332 (3d Cir), cert. denied sub. nor. Gould v.
Ruefenacht, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 428 (1984).
"' But cf. Colson v. Bertsch, 586 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (D.N.J. 1984)("What is required in
this area is not more judicial pronouncement but rather legislative clarification.").
"' 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
200 Bunch, supra note 64, at 1037.
"' The decision seems to incorporate some of the thoughts contained in FitzGibbon,
supra note 48. For example, the Court's conclusion that unique instruments not designed to
be publically traded were not securities is generally consistent with FitzGibbon's definition
of a security as an instrument which is or is capable of being the subject of transactions in
the financial markets. Note, supra note 110, at 1082 n.257.
... 455 U.S. at 555 n.4.
".. See Note, supra note 110, at 2080-84, for an attempt to clarify the Weaver case, in
part by reference to Professor FitzGibbon's proposed redefinition of the term security. See
FitzGibbon, supra note 48.
204 Colson v. Bertsch, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,662, 99,344
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regarding the sale-of-business doctrine. Currently, the purchase of the
majority of the stock of a corporation, with the intent to take an active
role in management, is a security in some, but not all, of the circuits. °0
The different approaches of the circuits to the commonality requirement
and the status of notes indicates that the meaning of the term "security"
is not self-evident to a reasonable person.06
A uniform and predictable definition of the term "security" is, in the
end, more important than the ultimate direction that the definition
takes.2"7 A clear definition will facilitate pretransaction planning and re-
duce the amount of litigation on the definitional issue. Thus, the most,
and perhaps only, effective solution to the problem of clarifying the defi-
nition of a security for the purposes of federal securities laws is new and
real guidance from the Supreme Court.2 0 8 Unfortunately, the Court in the
past has often refused to review securities law cases involving important,
unsettled questions. 20 9 Those cases that have been received have been de-
cided as narrowly as possible, without even a small amount of guidance
regarding undecided issues.
2 10
(D.N.J. 1984)("The court recognizes that it here confronts a difficult issue about which rea-
sonable minds can, and have, differed. It awaits guidance from the higher courts or, prefera-
bly, from Congress .... ").
205 See id., indicating that four circuits had accepted the doctrine and four had rejected
it, giving citations.
206 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the different views on the
commonality issue); Note, supra note 85 (a brief discussion of the different approaches the
federal courts have taken on the status of notes under the federal securities laws).
20I See Schauer, Redefining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U. MIcH.
J.L. REF. 1, 23 (1983).
10 But cf. Dillport, supra note 10, at 140; Orbe, supra note 181, at 251; Colson v. Bertsch,
586 F. Supp. 1289 (D.N.J. 1984)(alI calling for legislative clarification of the definition).
200 Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981);
Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Coffin
v. Polishing Machines, Inc. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Good-
man v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); S.E.C. v.
Glenn Turner, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Milnarik v. MS
Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). In these cases in-
volving the definition of security, the Supreme Court has denied review.
22 Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980)(case decided that scienter required in
actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and S.E.C. rule 10b-5; left open issue of whether scienter includes
reckless behavior); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980)(case held that
affirmative duty to disclose nonpublic information is necessary for violation of § 10(b) of
Securities Exchange Act; left open issue of whether such a duty can arise from misappropri-
ation of information); International Brotherhood Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9
(1979)(holding that interest in compulsory, noncontributory pension plan was not a security;
expressing no opinion on issue of whether an implied cause of action exists under § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933); Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries, In., 430 U.S. 1, 42 n.28
(1977)(tender offeror does not have standing to sue for damages under the Williams Act;
leaves open the question of whether shareholder-offerees or a target company have standing
to sue under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); T.S.C. Ind. v. Northway, Inc.,
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Recently there have been nine petitions for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court in cases involving the definition of a security. 1'
The Court has agreed to hear three of the cases, although one has subse-
quently been settled. The Court has denied review in six cases.2"2 The
number of requests for review probably reflects both the disarray of the
legal principles involved and the relative importance of the issue to the
business and legal communities.2'" The Court could, if it so desired, re-
solve some of the many questions discussed in this article in the two cases
it is reviewing and one or two additional carefully selected cases. To do
so, however, the Court would have to decide the cases in a manner that
gives meaningful guidance; in particular, the Court would have to decided
the cases on a basis that has meaning beyond the facts and circumstances
of the particular case at hand. In large part, this would involve answering
the "why" question and, perhaps, suggesting answers to questions not ex-
pressly raised in the cases.
Greater predictability would be possible if attorneys understood the ba-
sic philosophy guiding the Supreme Court in this area. The Court's phi-
426 U.S. 438, 444-45 n.7 (1976)(case decided what is a material fact under S.E.C. rule 14a9;
expressed no opinion on issue of showing of culpability necessary to establish liability under
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and S.E.C. rule 14a9); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-94 nn. 7 & 12 (1976)(scienter is a necessary element in im-
plied cause of action for damages under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
S.E.C. rule 10b-5; left open the issues of whether aiding and abetting liability was possible
under these provisions, the elements of aiding and abetting liability if it did exist, whether
and under what circumstances recklessness would meet the scienter requirement, and
whether scienter would be required element in Securities and Exchange Commission en-
forcement actions brought under these provisions); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 n.6 (1975)(one must be a purchaser or seller of a security to have
standing to sue for damages under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
S.E.C. rule 10b-5; expressed no opinion on the question of whether a implied cause of action
exists under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933). "The greater the number of qualifica-
tions, the less the Court is saying. And the more an opinion is limited to a relatively specific
factual pattern, the less someone faced with a slightly different factual situation can rely on
what the Court has already said." Schauer, supra note 207, at 12.
"' Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.) cert. granted sub. nom. Gould v.
Ruefenecht, U.S. __, 105 S. Ct. 428 (1984); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d
1348 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co.,
730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Chemical Bank v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir), cert. denied, __ U.S. ._,105 S. Ct. 253
(1984); Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3515
(1984); Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1982), appeal dis-
missed, 721 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1983), reu'd 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,__
U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985); Davis v. Auco Financial Services, Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 53 U.S.L.W. 3613 (1985); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Re-
sources, 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2341, appeal
dismissed, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 23 (1984); and Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985).
2 See supra note 211.
," See supra note 197.
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losophy was apparent for some time after the Howey decision; however, it
is clear that this is not the case today. It is impossible to discern what
policy is currently guiding the Court. The Justices may have decided to
reallocate cases between the federal and state court systems.2"' The Court
may also have reached the unarticulated conclusion that the benefits of
regulation in this area are often outweighed by the costs; 215 possibly the
purpose of the securities laws is simply to guarantee the integrity of fi-
nancial markets.216 The Court should clearly state why it has decided that
an instrument is or is not a security. Until the Court states its underlying
philosophy, the ability to predict the future course of this area of the law
will be minimal.21 7
The request that the Court lay down rules to provide guidance concern-
ing situations not before the Court might, at first glance, seem objectiona-
ble. However, the suggestion that the Court intentionally salt its opinions
with obiter dicta is supportable in light of the importance of the issue,
the need for predictability, and the relatively few opportunities the Court
has to provide such guidance.2 is The obligation of the Court to provide
2 4 To a large extent, this was the effect of the Court's decision in Sant Fe Indus. v.
Green, 420 U.S. 462 (1977). In that case the Court held that § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and S.E.C. rule 10b-5 did not provide a remedy in cases of mere corpo-
rate mismanagement, unaccompanied by deception or manipulation. The Court evidenced a
disinclination to bring within the aegis of the above provisions "a wide variety of corporate
conduct traditionally left to state regulation." Id. at 478. See also infra note 217.
2'0 See Comment, supra note 190 at 163, seeming to indicate that this is the current
philosophy guiding the Court in determining whether a security exists. Cf. Mofsky, supra
note 18, at 396 ("the very philosophy underlying the securities laws is being questioned, and
there is a growing body of empirical evidence that securities regulation is more harmful than
beneficial to society."); Lothian, The Role of the Government in the Securities Market, 33
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1587 (1979)(government regulation of securities markets do not justify the
costs of such regulation); Note Recklessness Under Section 10(b): Weathering the
Hochfelder Storm, 8 RUT. CAr. L. J. 325, 326-29 (1977)(recent securities law decisions of
Supreme Court reflect its probusiness attitude).
The focusing by the Court on the need for the protections of the federal securities laws
would suggest that the Court may be attempting to limit the application of the securities
laws, on a case-by-case basis, to those situations in which the benefits of regulation are
perceived to outweigh the costs. For example, the Court might have entertained the belief
that the existence of the federal scheme of banking regulation in Weaver made it likely that
the benefits of applying the securities laws to certificates of deposit would be outweighed by
the costs.
2" See supra notes 201-13 and accompanying text.
211 Vague statements such as "we are satisfied that Congress, in enacting the securities
laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud" are inadequate.
Weaver, 455 U.S. at 556. The important question is which frauds are covered. The Court
has given real guidance in a few securities law cases. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 462 is a good
example. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 431 F. Supp. 292
(N.D. Il. 1977), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 1175, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979);
Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). There is no reason to believe that it
could not do so again.
2"' The question of whether the Supreme Court should venture beyond the task of decid-
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clear guidance on a particular issue is inversely related to the number of
cases it accepts involving the issue.2"9 Due to the Court's position in the
federal court system, a lack of guidance is felt at lower levels.22 ° Lower
courts should, and most likely would, follow "clear, direct, explicit, and
unqualified" dictum of the Court; 2' thus, although the command to fol-
low might be absent, an invitation would at least be present."'
VII. CONCLUSION
Substantial doubt remains as to a number of important questions re-
garding the definition of security under the federal securities laws. These
include, but are not limited to:
1) whether the Howey test is a universal test, which all securities must
meet, or is merely meant to give content to the catch-all provisions of the
statutory definitions;
2) whether horizontal commonality is required, or whether vertical
commonality is sufficient;
3) whether an instrument can be a security as to one person and not to
another;
4) when lack of need for protection will result in a finding that the
federal securities laws are not applicable; and
5) what are the basic underlying policies guiding the Court in deciding
whether an instrument or a transaction is a security.
The Supreme Court has both the ability and the responsibility to bring
clarity to this area; it is to be hoped that the Court will make use of the
numerous opportunities it has to dispel the confusion. This is an area
ing cases and endeavor to provide guidance for the future has drawn comment from mem-
bers of the Court itself. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), Justice Rehn-
quist stated: "We are acutely aware, however, that we sit to decide concrete cases and not
abstract propositions of law. We decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern
all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to do so." Id. at 386. Chief
Justice Burger, concurring in part, stated:
As the Court states, however, "if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected." ... For this very rea-
son, I believe that we should articulate a standard that will govern similar cases
and afford guidance to corporations, counsel advising them, and federal courts.
Id. at 402 (Burger, J., concurring).
In addition, the known reliance of state courts on decisions interpreting the federal securi-
ties laws in conjunction with definitions of "security" under state law would seem to impose
a duty to provide the clearest guidance reasonably possible. See Karajala, supra note 35, at
43839.
Schauer, supra note 207, at 23.
" Id. at 4.
... Public Serv. Co. v. General Electric Co., 315 F.2d 306, 310 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 809 (1963).
22 Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). I have paraphrased the
language of the court.
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where the Court's performance should, in large part, be judged not by
whether its conclusions are correct, but rather by whether its decisions
are useful to those in need of guidance.22
" Schauer, supra note 207, at 24. Schauer states:
It may be too much to expect that the Court will always reach the "correct" re-
sult, but it is not too much to expect that the Court will at least always perform
its functions with care. One of those functions is that of guiding others, and it is a
function that deserves much closer attention.
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